Resumen: Durante la Segunda República Libanesa (1943Libanesa ( -1975) existía la percepción de que la comunidad maronita era la secta dominante del país y ostentaba un papel casi hegemónico dentro del marco confesional del Estado. Mediante el análisis de tres acontecimientos históricos clave (la "Revolución del Agua de Rosas" de 1952, la crisis de 1958 y las elecciones presidenciales de 1970), este ensayo tratará de probar que la comunidad maronita no ostentaba un control desproporcionado sobre la política libanesa y que el sectarianismo no era el factor predominante y definitorio de su sistema político, sino uno más entre otros lazos tradicionales, cuya influencia era aún mayor. Republic (1943Republic ( -1975, the Maronite Community was perceived as the country's leading sect, holding an almost hegemonic role within the state's confessional framework. By analyzing three key historical events (the 1952 "Rosewater Revolution", the 1958 Crisis and the 1970 presidential elections), this essay will try to prove that neither the Maronite Community held a disproportionate control over Lebanon's politics, nor sectarianism was the predominant factor defining its political system, but one among other traditional ties, whose influence was even bigger. 
Introduction


Between 1988 and 1990, the Lebanese Army, under the command of General Michel 'Aūn, and the strongest of the remaining Christian militias, the Lebanese Forces (al-quwwāt al-lubnāniyyah), fought a highly destructive, fratricide, intra-Christian war which brought the Civil War (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) to an end, ruining any chance of organized resistance against the Syrian invasion. However sad this episode might be, at least it gave a true picture of the internal divisions affecting all Lebanese communities, in spite of the Western press' tiresome -even misleading -insistence in presenting the conflict as a Muslim-Christian war, a kind of 'clash of civilizations' produced long before Huntington wrote his famous book.
This insistence, both journalistic and academic, on the confessional aspect of the Civil War is but a logic consequence of the peculiar structure of the Lebanese political system, where public office is distributed following a strict sectarian apportionment, which allows only certain  The original version of this article will be published by the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid in its collection of MA theses. Special thanks are due to María Isabel Fierro Bello (CCHS-CSIC) for her inestimable help throughout the process of writing it, and Fiona McCallum (University of St. Andrews) for her kind remarks and improvement suggestions. The transcription of personal and place names follows the rules of IJMES. Those place names having an English translation appear in their translated form (thus, Beirut and not Bayrūt). Names of authors are displayed as they appear in their books or articles.
emphasis directed at the external characteristics of the Lebanese political structure, the intra-sectarian aspect has been sorely forgotten, in spite of the recognition, by just a few authors 5 , of the importance of other loyalties beyond confessional belonging, like kinship or fealty, which in the case of the former was even considered «Lebanon's most solid and enduring tie» 6 , way ahead of confessional belonging. In the same spirit, Albert , therefore there is a felt need to study the inner working of the different Lebanese communities, in order to fully grasp the historical processes which took place in that country since it became an independent state.
Our essay will try to tackle this need making a contribution to the growing body of literature maintaining that confessionalism is not the dominant factor in Lebanese politics and, to do so, our attention will be focused on the Maronite community. An ethno-religious group 8 whose role during the First Republic has been variably described as preponderant 9 , dominant 10 , privileged 11 and even hegemonic 12 , which makes the unders- tanding of its internal dynamics a must to realize why the only Arab Middle East's experiment at political and economic liberalism crashed in such a dramatic way as a 15-year-long civil war. This study will also provide us with the opportunity to demonstrate the radical falsehood of the aforementioned adjectives, and to prove that there was no Maronite dominance or hegemony in Lebanese politics in the Republic of Independence, but «a full partnership between the various Christian and Moslem sects in which no one sect alone could determine policy» 13 . To achieve our goals, this essay is divided in three clearly differentiated parts. Apart from a thorough review of the available literature on Maronite History and Lebanese politics, we will examine Maronite politics in three periods: the Crises of 1952 and 1958 and the Legislative Election of 1970. In so doing, our attention will be focused in vital moments for Lebanon, emphasizing the inner working of the community, which will provide us with more information about it than a mere overview of Lebanese History during the studied period. After this second part, of an essentially descriptive nature, the third and last part of this essay will analyze the historical facts to give appropriate answers to the proposed questions.
Literature review
It is almost a tradition in Middle East scholarship to begin any essay on Lebanon by stating that primordial ties dominate that country's politics. The widely accepted importance of sect, kin, fealty and family in the development of political life in the country of the Cedar overwhelms the literature, and this paper does not pretend to break away from this tradition, but to question the assumption that many authors make about the predominance of the sectarian factor over other considerations (Michael Hudson, Fawwaz Traboulsi, Camille Habib, Jihad Nammour). Curiously, most of these "anti-confessional" scholars have also the tendency to underline what they label as Christian dominance over Lebanese politics, that is the case, for instance, of Fawwaz Traboulsi, who goes as far as to affirm that «sectarian pluralism barely concealed Maronite political primacy» 14 . For most of the mentioned authors, confessionalism in particular, and the survival in general, of these traditional ties prevented the modernization of the Lebanese political system, this being the opinion of Michael Hudson, for whom «the proportional representation solution for sectarian tensions aggravated other problems because of the policy immobilism that it engendered [preventing] the Lebanese state to modernize itself» 15 , whereas Camille Habib thinks that «[c]onsociation is a system that contradicts the rules of Western democracy [and] defies the modern spirit of individual endeavour and social change» 16 . In his opinion, the «confessional political system breeds nothing but crises» 17 . Even some of the authors recognizing the prominent role played by other traditional ties, alongside confessionalism, in the political life of Lebanon, characterize their persistence as having negative consequences, Nizar Hamzeh, for example, considers that the former have had «a constraining effect on the enactment of universalistic policies and [have] discouraged the development of citizen participation» 18 . However, as has already been mentioned, we will maintain throughout this study -together with authors the like of Farid el-Khazen, Samir Khalaf, Caroline E.A. Knight or Oren Barak, that confessionalism was neither the foremost factor conditioning Lebanese life during the Second Republic nor a factor preventing its political modernization because, as Samir Khalaf states, «political modernization and the persistence of traditions need not be incompatible» 19 . Moreover, we fully coincide with Caroline E. A. Knight, when she says that «confessionalism has been used as a scapegoat for many problems whose true roots lie somewhere» 20 . In order to do so, our attention will be concentrated on the evolution of the Maronite community, trying to prove that this tā'ifah did not hold a hegemonic domination over Lebanon during the period under study, being instead participant in a consociational arrangement that «functioned relatively well [until] it was subjected to [...] externally-generated pressure» 21 . By putting the focus over this community, we are also trying to pay our modest contribution to a sector of scholarship which has been, until now, utterly neglected: that of Maronite History in independent Lebanon. It is truly surprising that, leaving aside a couple of PhD or MPhil thesis 22 To achieve our goals, attention will be given first to the historical evolution of the Lebanese State between its independence and the outbreak of the Civil war, by centering on three fundamental events: the 1952 "Rosewater Revolution", the 1958 Crisis and the 1970 presidential elections, which will be followed by an analysis where the hypothesis presented in this section will be confirmed. at the same time that regional threats to the country's independence were finally suffocated with the signing of the founding document of the Arab League, the Alexandria Protocol (October 7 th 1944), whose article 4 «emphasize[s the Arab States] respect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers» 37 . In the internal scene, Khūrī's mandate is considered the golden age of the "Merchant Republic", an era of unbridled capitalism and economic flourishing, which Kamal Salibi defines as a time of «phenomenal prosperity» 38 . Long before the advent of oil money from the Gulf, Lebanon had already become an international trading center 39 , which was judiciously spending its wartime savings in the development of massive infrastructure projects, like the construction of a new airport. «In no time», Samir Khalaf reminds, «Beirut evolved into the main financial center of the Middle East and one of the leading centers in the world» 40 . The Lebanese economy benefited even from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which provided the country with a huge pool of unskilled and inexpensive labor, but also with the investments and training brought in by the Palestinian middle classes 41 (one of them, Yūsif Baydas, popularly known as «monsieur cent milliards» 42 , founded what was to become Lebanon's largest bank, the Intra, and also its biggest financial scandal, when the Bank collapsed in 1966). Moreover, the Arab boycott against Israel did also redound to the benefit of Beirut's role as a trading center, for most firms settled in Palestine relocated to its northern neighbor. However brilliant the macro-economic framework could seem, prosperity did not benefit all elements of the Lebanese society equally. In fact, the service-oriented economy was under the control of an extremely reduced number of families -mostly Christian 43 , known as "the consortium" which held «monopolistic control over the main axes of the country's economy» 44 , including two-thirds of all foreign imports 45 , and around 40% of the GNP for 1948 46 . At the same time, lower-income strata, which represented about 78% of the total population, controlled less than a fourth of national income 47 .
Historicak study
Together with such an unequal income distribution, Bishārah al-Khūrī's mandate was also plagued by corruption and nepotism 48 , as well as by scandalous electoral fraud, both in the legislative elections of 1947 and 1951, the former being vividly described by Denise Ammoun in the following terms:
preventing the President to serve more than one consecutive mandate. His goal achieved by the favorable vote of the National Assembly on May 22 nd 1947, this provoked, nonetheless, the apparition of a growing, nation-wide and inter-sectarian opposition 50 to his rule, which was further fed by the economic discontent extended among the middle and lower classes 51 , and ended up by exploding after the legislative elections of 1951, which being cleaner than those of 1947 52 , gave the opposition more visibility. Moreover, the death of Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, killed in Amman on July 17 th 1951, dealt a severe blow to Khūrī, who lost one of the mainstays of his power. The Sunni leader, whose prestige both among his coreligionists and around the Arab world, was intact, and his Maronite counterpart had been masters in «the art of Levantine patronage» 53 ; without him and his ability «to control the Moslem populace in times of crisis» 54 , Khūrī started to find increasingly difficult to reshuffle the cabinet in order to ensure his permanence in power.
Meanwhile, the Opposition was organized under a common platform calling for social and political reform 55 , which was variously labeled as the "Socialist Front" 56 rd 1952, less than a week after Bishārah al-Khūrī's resignation, the National Assembly elected Kamīl Sham'ūn as the second President of independent Lebanon. In his nomination speech, the President «promised to fight corruption, talked about the 'modesty and ascetism' of the president's post and promised to abolish the privileges and formalities attached to it» 66 , and in consonance with the platform of the anti-Khūrī Opposition, he also promised to foster a reformist agenda to end the abuses that had characterized the former Administration 67 . This initial reformist impulse, embodied by Khālid Shihāb's "Cabinet of Decrees", manifested itself in a number of far-reaching reforms affecting both the public and the private sectors 68 (including granting voting rights to women, or establishing civil service examinations). However, the precarious alliance that had brought Sham'ūn to power started soon to decompose, due to its members' different positions on the extent of such reforms 69 , and the President started to rely on the Consortium and on President Khūrī's former allies in the Constitutional Bloc 70 . Sham'ūn's halfhearted reforms 71 were not enough to alter the socioeconomic foundations of the Republic, which continued maintaining a laissez-faire outlook excluding most of the population from the benefits of an economic growth which continued unabated, in spite of the political turmoil affecting both the country and the region 72 . The passing of a banking secrecy law, in 1957, the growing gold coverage of the Lebanese pound (which attained a 95% by the end of 1955 73 ) and the arrival of Arab capitals fleeing from the nationalizing policies then en vogue in most Middle East countries, only served to consolidate the country's outwardlooking, service-oriented economic outlook.
However, Sham'ūn's presidency is best remembered for the exorbitant role Lebanon came to play in Middle East politics 74 The Maronite League, a lay organization of Maronite notables, went as far as to present a formal complaint to Pope Pius XII protesting against the Patriarch's political activities 110 , and a number of bishops followed on the steps of the League by cabling the Holy See to criticize his stance during the crisis 111 . Nonetheless, the Vatican remained silent preferring not to interfere within the internal affairs of the Maronite Church 112 . In this tense atmosphere, the murder, on May 8 th 1958, of Nasīb alMatnī, owner of the opposition journal Al-Teleghraf, served as a pretext for the beginning of hostilities between the Opposition and the Government. For the following two months, both parties strove for the control of the country, though the fighting reached different levels of intensity, depending on the area -with the Shūf, Beirut and Tripoli being particularly affected 113 -and normal life continued with just minimal disruptions (e.g.: in Beirut, fighting normally «took place in the afternoons and at night, also in several instances over the weekend» 114 ). In order to put an end to the conflict, and given the fact that the Opposition was receiving arms smuggled from the Syrian province of the UAR 115 , the Lebanese Government, which feared a coup d'état, requested US intervention 116 and presented an official complaint against the UAR before the United Nations 117 . However, none of these requests bear fruit until the Iraqi Revolution of July 14 th , which threatening to knock down the entire web of American alliances in the Middle East, triggered a coordinated Anglo-American operation to protect both the Lebanese and the Jordanian regimes, the remaining Arab Allies of the West in the region.
Despite the initial tension between American and Lebanese troops 118 , the US intervention paved the way for a solution to the crisis, leading to presidential elections on July 31 st , which brought a neutral and respected figure, the commander of the Army, General Shihāb to the presidency. The General's election «brought about a perceptible relaxation in the level of hostility» 119 , although Sham'ūn, who insisted in serving his full term 120 , did not step down until September 23 rd . Thereafter, Shihāb assumed the presidential powers and entrusted Rashīd Karāmī, one of the leaders of the insurrection in Tripoli, with the task of forming a new government, which he duly did presenting a cabinet fully composed of sympathizers of the rebellion, to the exclusion of the former majority. His subsequent declaration, that the Cabinet had come to "harvest the fruits of revolution" 121 , as well as the kidnapping and murder of Fu'ād Haddād, editor of al-Amal, the official press organ of the Katā'ib, led to a violent wave of protests, a true «counterrevolution» 122 affecting mainly the Christian areas 123 , which did not cease until October 14 th when a new, fourman cabinet was formed, including an equal number of representatives from both sides, under a formula which was soon to become famous: la ghālib wa la maghlūb ("no victor and no vanquished").
The 1970 Elections
If the presidencies of Khūrī and Sham'ūn had been the golden age of laissez-faire, an era of unrestricted economic liberalism and prodigious economic growth, Fu'ād Shihāb and his heir in the Presidency, Shāril Ḥilū, are remembered for their Keynesian economic orientation (more pronounced in the case of the General 124 ) and their attempt «to introduce comprehensive reforms in [Lebanon's] political and administrative system». Both presidents achieved an immense success in reducing the inequalities that had plagued the country, so that by 1974 the middle class represented two-thirds of the population 125 . However, the rule of Shihāb had also its dark side, for the development of socio-economic projects could not mask the growing influence of the Military Intelligence Service, known as the Deuxième Bureau, which overstepped its mission to control the country's external and internal security 126 , becoming an authentic political police that «interfered in domestic political life, the administration, legislative and municipal elections, distributed licences for carrying firearms and engaged in arbitrary arrests» 127 . On the eve of the 1970 presidential elections, the country was facing several challenges to its very survival, in spite of the economic prosperity it still enjoyed (although the Intra Bank crash had dealt a harsh blow to the international prestige of the Lebanese financial system 128 ), the gravest of them being the armed presence of Palestinian guerrillas, whose attacks against Israel from Southern Lebanon triggered Israeli retaliations which struck vital infrastructures (like the bombing of Beirut Airport on December 28 th 1968). The Palestinian presence became rapidly an extremely divisive issue in Lebanese political life, for, whereas most Muslims supported it and demanded the government to «give a free hand to Palestinian organization» 129 , a majority of Christians feared that the guerrillas were being used as a tool «to subvert the Lebanese system» The new coalition profited from the thirst for a change that existed in the population after more than a decade of Shihābist rule 133 and, together with the Central Bloc, score a victory over the establishment candidates in the 1968 legislative elections. However small -only one seat -might have been the difference between the Ḥilf and the Nahj (as were known the Shihāabist deputies), the Ḥilf won by landslide in Mount Lebanon 134 , revealing thus the growing opposition of the Christian communities to the continuation of Shihābism, which many of them regarded as «a threat to their own positions and to the Christian character of Lebanon» 135 . Knowing how difficult it would be to elect a president of their choice with both blocs in the Assembly commanding an almost equal number of MPs, relevant members of the Nahj pressured General Shihāb to run as candidate for another mandate, which was constitutionally possible, as six years had passed since he had left the Presidency. Even though Shihāb toyed with the idea of making a comeback, he finally dropped it, not only because his candidacy was opposed by most Maronite leaders, including the Patriarch 136 , but also because he could not obtain the unanimous support of the Muslim leaders for his plan to military cripple the Palestinian With Shihāb out of the scene, the Nahj rushed to select a candidate, and the choice finally fell on Ilyās Sarkīs, Shihāb's appointee 139 . An efficient administrator, who had served as director of the National Bank, Sarkīs, who lacked a political base of his own 140 , was nonetheless a much weaker candidate than the former President, being opposed even by a significant section of the Nahj 141 . On the Opposition side, the three leaders of the Ḥilf, coveted the presidency, but being unable to muster all the votes required to reach their goal, they decided to block Sarkīs' candidacy by supporting a consensus candidate 142 . The designation of such a candidate was not to be, however, an easy task, and it was not until twenty four hours before the electoral séance 143 that the coalition agreed on a candidate: Sulaymān Faranjiyyah.
The choice of Faranjiyyah, a Mountain za'īm from Northern Lebanon, who had been involved in the infamous Tuerie de Mizyārah
144
, responded to his appearance as a strong man, who would be able to impose his authority over the country after Ḥilū's weak presidency 145 . Moreover, his opposition to Sham'ūn during the 1958 uprising, as well as his belonging to a political coalition (the "Central Bloc", also known by its name in Arabic as al-Wasaṭ) whose other leaders were Muslims (the Sunni Ṣā'ib Salām and the Shiite Kāmil el-As'ad), made him appear as «a Maronite notable who [did] not [confine] his loyalties to the Christian community» 146 . Faranjiyyah was, thus, the perfect consensus candidate.
The election took place on August 17 th 1970 and was a hectic event. Three ballots were needed before the President was finally chosen, and even then, Faranjiyyah was elected by only a vote of difference over Sarkīs. Paradoxically, a man so representative of the feudal class ascended to the presidency thanks to the votes of a man who wanted to completely modify the Lebanese system 147 : Kamāl Junblāṭ, who, together with three other members of his group 148 , voted for Faranjiyyah, giving him thus the necessary advantage to win the election.
Faranjiyyah's election was a fateful choice. Lacking ability and tact, the new President was soon unable, in spite of a promising beginning with the appointment of a Youth Cabinet under the leadership of his partner Ṣā'ib Salām 149 , to control the situation of a country suffering of serious internal and international problems. Focused on hoarding power by stretching to the limit the wide constitutional faculties of the President, he alienated the whole Sunni establishment. With the positions on both sides of the political divide progressively radicalized, the war seemed inevitable.
Analysis
When, after fifteen years of Civil War, the remnants of the Lebanese Parliament met in Saudi city of Ṭā'if to reach a peace agreement, the participating deputies addressed what was widely believed to be Lebanon's foremost problem: that of confessionalism and sectarian imbalance. Therefore, presidential powers were severely curtailed to the benefit of the Sunni Prime Minister, and confessionalism was mostly abolished throughout the Administration 150 (except at the level of Director-General). Moreover, Lebanon's identity was constitutionally defined as "Arab" and the country was put under Syrian overlordship 151 . However, when a quarter of century has passed since the ratification of the Agreement, Lebanon remains a hotspot in the Middle East; sectarian infighting, administrative corruption and financial misdemeanors have been plaguing the country ever since, making its Second Republic (1943 Republic ( -1975 appear as a cherished memory of an era of economic growth and inter-religious harmony. How is it possible, then, that if confessionalism and "Maronite primacy" were the main reasons behind the war's outbreak, its collapse has not brought peace and stability? The answer is obvious, because neither Maronite "hegemony" existed nor confessionalism was the main engine driving the Lebanese political machine. Beginning by the latter, it is obvious that Lebanon was a State organized under confessional lines, for positions in its political and administrative apparatuses were distributed following sectarian criteria, however, «guaranteeing equity and amity by a proportional representation of the different confessional groups» 152 not only did not prevent the formation of inter-sectarian groupings, but even worked to «[ensure] that electoral alliances and programmes [cut] across communal divisions» 153 , as deputies represented the whole nation and not only their sect.
The examples provided above underline this trans-communalism of Lebanese politics, as in the three studied periods, alliances crossed confessional boundaries and were forged over ideological, economic or social interests. In 1952, opposition to Bishārah al-Khūrī's corrupt regime came from both sides of the religious divide, and its main leaders, making an intelligent use of the media to mobilize a dissatisfied power opinion against the Government 154 , joined together in an ad-hoc political movement, the Socialist Front, to overthrow a President whose growing accumulation of power threatened their position in the political game 155 . The "Revolt of the Pashas", in 1958, followed a similar scheme of wide élite resistance against a President determined to reinforce his power over other powerful political brokers (first, with the 1957 electoral reform which excluded most za'īm-s from the Assembly, and later with Sham'ūn's willingness to amend the Constitution to ensure his reelection), who rapidly constituted an expedient and temporary political umbrella to advance their goals, the National Union Front, which despite all its Pan-Arabist rhetoric, did not have a true desire of breaking Lebanon's ties with the West 156 . The establishment of the Third Force, including many Christian leaders, underlined that Opposition to Sham'ūn was not based mainly based neither on his Western affiliation nor on his liberalism, but on what was perceived as his breaking the rules governing balance of power in Lebanon.
The 1970 elections constitute maybe an even better example of this inter-sectarian élite cooperation, as Shihāb's reelection was opposed not only by the mainly Christian Ḥilf, but also by wide sections of the Muslim establishment 157 , and Faranjiyyah's election under the banner of the IslamoChristian Wasaṭ alliance, was only possible thanks to the votes of Kāmal Junblāṭ's Progressive Socialist Party, who legitimately maneuvered within the system to advance his own political goals 158 . These examples prove sufficiently the lack of basis of those explanations arguing for the primacy of sectarianism over other ties in Lebanon, and gives credence to Oren Barak's assertion about the primacy of the intra-sectarian aspect over the inter-sectarian, for that country is characterized by its «"pluralism within pluralism" [meaning that there exists a] pronounced internal diversity within each of its communities» 159 , to the point that inter-sectarian alliances are very often needed to counter intra-sectarian feuds 160 . Instead of sectarianism, the two elements that dominated political life in Lebanon during the studied period were kinship and za'īm-ship.
Samir Khalaf defines kinship as «Lebanon's most solid and enduring tie» 161 and as an almost sovereign institution, acting as the individual's «exclusive agency of political socialization and tutelage» 162 . The importance of blood relations is underlined not only by the fact that Lebanese politics during the period examined in this essay were the preserve of a reduced number of families (Iddih, Salām, Karāmī, Junblāṭ), who compete furiously for parliamentary and governmental appointments, but also by the fact that an individual's stand in the social and political Contrary to the opinion of Nizar Hamzeh or Michael Hudson, the persistence of these traditional ties did not make the Lebanese system neither innately weak 171 nor unable to modernize 172 . Had it been so, it is unexplainable why Lebanon's score on almost all indicators of political and social development was much better than those of other Third World countries whose political systems were organized alongside more "modern" lines 173 . On the contrary, as Samir Khalaf states, it was precisely the persistence of such traditional bonds that led the way to a specifically Lebanese approach to modernity, based on adaptation and assimilation, not swift transformation 174 , that could have persisted and reached new heights had it not been for the external pressures the system had to deal with from 1967 onwards, which overwhelmed its capabilities to withstand change and prevented the continuation of its natural development.
On the question of Maronite primacy, it is important to examine the figure of the President, who was -and still is -always a member of that Church. Taking into account the dispositions of the 1926 Constitution, the Lebanese President could be defined as an «autocrat» 175 , an heir to French colonialism 176 or even a corporal incarnation of the State 177 . However, and in spite of the express provisions of the Fundamental Law, it is important to take into account that Constitutional Law goes well beyond "Law on the books" to cover customs and practices whose importance often equals that of written Law. In the Lebanese case, the National Pact not only was intended to provide for the distribution of official positions under a sectarian formula, it also established a power-sharing agreement between the President and the Prime Minister, whereby the President had to restrain his power to become something akin to an arbiter, in the words of Professor Hourani:
it [was] Whenever the President forsook his arbitral role to push for his own interests, disturbing thereby the balance and compromise that characterized Lebanon's politics 179 , the political equilibrium has been severely perturbed, as happened in 1952 and 1958. When Khūr and Sham'ūn's actions went well beyond the accepted consensus, the response of the political élite was to block their action until they were forced to back out. The reverse was also true, for in the late 1970's Faranjiyyah refused to cooperate with his arch-rival Rashīd Karāmī, whom he had had to appoint as Premier in a desperate attempt to quell the violence which was extending throughout the country, and thus crippled the Cabinet's ability to enforce its authority. It can therefore be said that the system worked under a double-veto arrangement which effectively limited the wide Constitutional powers of the President.
The alleged supremacy of the Maronite community is also questionable when the internal divisions affecting the Church and its members are taken into account. For almost a century, between the 1820s and the inception of the French Mandate, the Church, having gotten rid of the influence of the Maronite feudal lords (mainly of the Khāzin family), became the dominant influence in the Mountain 180 , and her Patriarchs the principal spokesmen for the community. The accession of powerful figures, 181 like Būlus Mas'ad, Yūḥanā al-Ḥāj or Ilyās al-Ḥuwayyik, to the Patriarchal throne only served to confirm this empowerment of the Church which came to its zenith with the travel of Mgr. Ḥuwayyik to the Paris Peace Conference where he presided one of the Lebanese Delegations, demanding the independence of the country and the extension of its borders 182 . However, as soon as the Lebanese Delegation's goals were achieved, the leading role in the community passed from the Patriarch to the politicians, and thus the unity of the community under a common project was broken. Iddih and Khūrī, under the French Mandate, represented the first of the long series of intra-Maronite quarrels that plagued the History of independent Lebanon.
Given the chasm dividing most Maronite leaders, their quest for political prominence had to deal on the support of other confessional groups. As has been seen throughout this essay, both Khūrī and Sham'ūn acceded to the presidency thanks to the support of most Muslim leaders and both Presidents kept their position by building a preferential alliance with a prominent member of the Sunni community 183 , and in spite of the opposition of the Maronite Patriarch (Mgr. Arīḍah during Khūrī's tenure and Mgr. Ma'ūshī during Sham'ūn's presidency) to their respective political orientation 184 . The influence of the Maronite political élite was thus limited and, in fact, the community's apparent advantage in the educative and professional arenas over her Muslim counterparts was progressively eroded during the Republic as more Muslims started receiving a formalized education 185 and acceding the professional sectors of the economy 186 . By 1975, the Maronites were just another community within the Lebanese mosaic-like sectarian framework
Conclusion
On March 10 th 1949, the editor-in-chief and owner of the daily L'Orient, Georges Naccache published an editorial which was to become famous and to put him in jail. Deux négations ne font pas une nation expressed a considerable distrust towards that gentleman's agreement between Bishārah al-Khūrī and Riyād al-Ṣulḥ, which was to be known as the "National Pact". «À la force de ne vouloir ni l'Ouest ni l'Est [...] nos dirigeants ont fini par nous faire perdre le nord» 187 deplored Mr. Naccache in his article, but despite all his mistrust towards the agreement, it managed to give Lebanon over thirty years of prosperity, only briefly broken twice until the definitive disruption of civil life in 1975.
In this essay, we have tried to prove that the era inaugurated by the National Pact witnessed an unrivaled trend of political and social modernization, reducing the gaps between the different sectarian and regional groups the Lebanese society is composed of, and generating a level of personal and political freedom without comparison in the Middle East. The fact that this trend took place while traditional ties continued commanding the loyalty of wide sections of the population cannot, in any case, overshadow the merit of the progress achieved between 1943 and 1975. In fact, the compatibility between the persistence of traditional bonds and progress serves to destroy those radical approaches that only conceive of modernization within a Western-like framework based on individualism and secularization.
Our approach to the evolution of Lebanon during its Second Republic has also permitted us to realize how confessionalism was not the main factor driving that country's politics, but only one more amongst other ties.
We have actually tried to prove how political tension used to have more an intra-communal than an inter-communal character, while at the same time, alliances and cooperation extended well beyond sectarian boundaries, defying thus, the «essentialism [of those authors who conceive] of ethnic groups as rigid, homogeneous, and unchanging entities» 188 . The study of confessionalism that has been undertaken throughout these pages has had the Maronite Church as its main character. Thereby it has been tried to pay a modest contribution to an area of scholarship utterly deserted by the Academia, despite the fact that the Maronite Church is not only the only Christian compact minority in the Middle East, but also one of the few of such communities conceiving of herself as nation. By focusing on this Church, we have also aspired to overcome the prejudices which defined her as a dominant, hegemonic or even racially prejudiced community 189 , and I believe that our goals have been reached, for it has been sufficiently proved that the Maronites participated as equal partners in a power-sharing agreement with all other Lebanese communities, and were far from being a solid, united bloc, suffering instead from profound internal divisions which forced the different sectors of the community to build trans-sectarian alliances in order to reach their political goals. Under the Second Republic, the Maronite Church was not, in spite of all appearances, a Ecclesia Triumphans.
